IT IS NOT A DONE DEAL!

CITY AND STATE OFFICIALS, ANSWER THE HARD QUESTIONS:

WHERE IS THE COMPLETED ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT?

WHAT HAPPENED TO THE HYBRID ELEVATED AND THE HYBRID SURFACE OPTIONS – THAT THE STAKEHOLDERS ADVISORY COMMITTEE APPROVED? WHY AREN'T THEY BEING STUDIED?

PROCEEDING WITH THE TUNNEL PROJECT IS ILLEGAL:

- ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW FIRST
- RECORD OF DECISION NEXT
- BEST OPTION GETS BUILT

ELECTED OFFICIALS UNDERTAKING ILLEGAL ACTS BY EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE FIAT SHOULD BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE

ABIDE BY NEPA AND SEPA





The Four Arguments Against the Tunnel Are the Same As The Four Greatest Threats It Poses To All of Us

Traffic and Fire Safety Down the Hole

Urban Destruction Environmental Disaster More Taxes & Fiscal In-Stability

THE BIG QUESTIONS ARE ANSWERED HERE

Questions: How is the deep bored tunnel project any different from the Deepwater Horizon disaster? How is the deep bored tunnel different from the Big Dig? How is the deep bored tunnel project different from those other projects where the tunnel bores collapsed, like in Cologne, Germany? How is this deep bored tunnel going to be different from the tunnels in Santa Clara, near Oakland, in Europe and elsewhere that ended up as deadly conflagrations, as highways of death? How is the tunnel going to solve our traffic problems?

Answers: In substance and practice it is no different from any of these other tunnels. It won't solve traffic problems, it's not going to be any safer. There is no guarantee part of it won't collapse during boring, cause damage – same happened at Beacon Hill, Brightwater tunnels.

Bottom Line: The answer to these questions and more is that the tunnel is no different from any of the above situations - The only difference about this tunnel project is that there is still time to *stop it* from going forward before it visits an environmental, urban, and economic disaster upon Seattle and its citizens.

TUNNEL-LITE DONE ON THE CHEAP IS NOT A SAFE TUNNEL

"Public Safety" and the margins or measures of that safety are extremely relative terms now-a-days, and the tunnel project is no different. At the governmental level safety is caught up in political expediencies and quantitative calculations about how risky is a risk, how fungible are people, what levels of casualty are acceptable, and certainly at all times, setting priorities so that the government-business agenda gets highest priority over the people's needs.

That's the same kind of thinking behind the safety for the deep bored tunnel. Rather than the Washington State Department of Transportation ("WSDOT"), or the City of Seattle via the Seattle Fire Department ensuring a high level of safety, their goal is to ensure a low level of costs or cost overruns(or

the specter of) in order to guarantee that the tunnel project gets started in the first place. You know the drill – once its underway there is no turning back and cost will be no object.


WSDOT has taken short cut after short cut to do this project, intentionally sacrificing safety along the way. To do it well and to have the safest structure, well the project shouldn't be going forward because it is so ill conceived and can't be made safe within the context that it must exist – sandwiched in between King and Thomas streets, and two, we don't have the money to construct a really safe structure if we had the room to build it. So why are we building it?

A calculated blind eye has been turned towards safety on this project by WSDOT. WSDOT in complicity with our elected and unelected officials are pursuing a course of compromised safety doing things like adjusting fire ratings, asking for safety standard deviations, and exemptions from environmental protection paradigms – and receiving them – from agencies like the Seattle Fire Department, and the Federal Highway Administration. See http://www.scatnow.com/DeviationRelatedDocuments/

Safety is a relative concept that is first politicized and then delegitimized as a guiding factor in governance - accordingly the Seattle Fire Department giving WSDOT a pass to construct a tunnel that has an inferior level of fire safety, the FHWA allowing WSDOT to design a less safe roadway in and out of the tunnel, that is considered an acceptable practice by the City and State. What do you think?

DENNY HILL, BEACON HILL, BRIGHTWATER AND ALL THE OTHER TUNNEL MISADVENTURES OF THE WORLD MEET SEATTLE DEEP BORED TUNNEL

Much of the information that the local media has circulated about the deep bored tunnel project centers on the dollar cost of this project, but relatively little attention has been given to the fact that bored tunnels are environmental disasters, "controlled" yes, but disasters just the same. They contaminate copious amounts of water, expose contaminates, create massive quantities of dirt and debris that must be disposed of, not to mention they also pollute the air more than conventional construction projects.



Beginning in 1903 and again in 1910, Denny Hill, was whittled away by continuous blasts of water – thousands of gallons of water a day were pumped from Lake Union to the top of the hill to sluice the hundreds of

thousands of cubic yards of dirt that made up Denny Hill into Elliott Bay.

The deep bored tunnel will require that over 840,000 cubic yards (or 35,000 truck loads or 10,000 hopper car loads) of contaminated soil, dirt, and rock, the "spoils" from the tunnel, will have to be disposed of somewhere. Unlike what happened with Denny Hill, this material mined and excavated for the tunnel won't be dumped into Elliott Bay or the Puget Sound, but it will be disposed of "somewhere" and it will be ecologically destructive to that somewhere.

In addition to the disposal of the tunnel spoils, it will be necessary to treat and dispose of over 75 Million gallons of water that is either used in the construction or pumped to the surface as part of the dewatering process that is essential to tunnel construction. The ground water pumped out will likely contain dissolved methane, sulfide, and/or carbon dioxide, and the construction related water that is used in a variety of ways, including as part of a slurry that is made to remove the spoils, it will in many cases be injected with such compounds as bentonite and a variety of chemicals used in tunneling projects. Unlike the spoils, both the ground and the construction water after "treatment" will ultimately be discharged into Elliott Bay or the Sound.

Because the groundwater pressures are so great, after construction there will still be contaminated water to dispose of, the designed amount of water leakage that will seep into the tunnel; it will have to collected, treated, and channeled to sumps for discharge, also into the Sound. It should be noted, that groundwater that contains sulfide concentrations cannot always be successfully treated, that it is highly toxic to marine life, and is damaging to both concrete sewer linings and water treatment plant

anaerobic digesters, thus it has to be treated prior to being exposed to air in order to have a better chance of becoming sulfide free.



There is also a great deal of air pollution associated with constructing this tunnel. That pollution is not limited to just the excessive amount of exhaust derived from the fuels burned related to tunnel construction, which is greater

than other forms of above surface construction, but there is also the air pollution related to the gases that are released from the groundwater that has to be pumped out for the tunnel. Methane, carbon dioxide, and hydrogen sulfide gases that are released from the groundwater during tunneling can gather in the excavation area and are explosive and/or asphyxiating. They have to be vented, adding to the already large list of negative environmental effects this tunnel represents.

In addition, little attention has been given either to the fact that with a fair amount of regularity bored tunnel projects experience cave-ins as they are being bored due to either design faults, construction deviations, or the geological unsuitability of the project.

The tunnel collapse in Cologne, Germany, in 2009 is just one of many tunnel projects where this has happened (see below and above link for information about how pervasive this problem is). Far from



being unusual these situations happen all too often. It is no coincidence that both of the tunnel projects in the Seattle area experienced these problems. Those were "small" tunnels in comparison to the one that WSDOT and the City of Seattle are insisting on starting. The magnitude of harm should something go wrong with the Alaskan Way tunnel will be much greater in its urban setting.

The conditions that led to the collapse in Cologne were not that different than here. The WSDOT expectation is to solve most if not all the boring/ground instability problems with the jet

grouting – the process they tout as a miracle cure for tunneling pitfalls. But as in Cologne, so here, extensive groundwater permeation and water inflows exist along the tunnel pathway.

In Cologne it was a river adjacent to the project that created the pressure, here there is the hydrologic pressure from a whole bay and sound to contend with. In Cologne there was a highly developed urban setting with older buildings surrounding and standing above the pathway of the tunnel, same here. But we're supposed to forget about that though because WSDOT has profusely assured the public in general, the Pioneer Square people and other property owners in particular that they have everything under control. And of course WSDOT is holding ongoing preemptive meetings with the latter groups - the WSDOT PR arm has established ongoing meetings with property owners in order to diffuse any opposition or concern about the safety and stability of the tunnel project.

Of course we all know what will happen in response to the disclosures about the high risk of a tunnel collapse, the WSDOT and tunnel apologists machine will go into overdrive. The Seattle Chamber and Downtown Association will invoke their approval of the project, followed by the Discovery Institute acolytes and Bob Donegan from Ivars running the private interference that WSDOT cannot. WSDOT's Hammond or Dye will claim they have everything under control. Then EnviroIssues will step in and start churning out their flyers entitled, "Why Seattle's Deep Bored Tunnel is not the Cologne Tunnel", or "Lessons Learned: It Can't Happen Here". They will then add those same pages to their PowerPoint presentations that they are showing at those meetings they are holding just about every other day around town as part of the tunnel "outreach" campaign.

BIG DIG and DEEPWATER HORIZON MEET THE DEEP BORED TUNNEL

"The whole Big Dig project has been so rife with corruption, cronyism, graft, nepotism and wholesale criminal negligence from its inception" Workers' World



DeepWater Horizon vs. Deep Bored Tunnel



This tunnel project is every inch the land-side corollary to the Deepwater Horizon situation, i.e. epic disaster. The tunneling industry has the same deep roots and questionable relationships with and within WSDOT, as the oil industry and BP has with the US Mines and Mineral Service and with the Department of the Interior. We all know how well that worked out.

Tunnel industry business reps and tunnel industry business groups have connections to WSDOT that go back to pre-2001; they have only deepened since that time. This dynamic paved the way for WSDOT in conjunction with its tunneling industry connections and consultants to use State resources to bring about a

deep bored tunnel.

In an article in the NY Times mid-June it was reported, "BP's Ties to Government Are Long and Complex", it then went on to detail how corporate interests had been developed within the federal agency that was supposed to have oversight of the oil industry. By obtaining appointed positions within these governmental agencies, by gaining official and consultant positions, individuals with strong industry ties were able to evade regulation of the oil industry often, get sweetheart treatment, and even have a large hand in establishing and guiding departmental policies, rules, and regulations for the project they had an interest in. The critical focus in the inquiry into the Deepwater Horizon matter relates to these industry infiltrations, the cooption of the agencies by business, and the concomitant lax regulation and outright circumvention of environmental laws that this allowed the non-governmental interests to achieve.

For example, the State, City, with the FHWA's blessing are all proceeding with the tunnel project, despite the environmental impact statement for the Viaduct replacement project not being complete. By law the EIS is intended to lead to an informed decision about whether to undertake a project or not. Rather than an informed decision about a tunnel, we have uninformed officials, elected and unelected, engaging in illegal acts – they are breaking both Federal and State law by proceeding with the project prior to a Record of Decision being issued, pursuant to a completed NEPA and SEPA review process.



Carmen "Cheese Man" DiNunzio who was arrested on charges stemming from paying a \$10,000 bribe to secure a \$6 million contract for the Big Dig

This is sort of culture and practice that pervades WSDOT. They are no more independent of industry influence than those federal agencies involved in the Deepwater scandal are. At the end of this handout is a list of the tunneling industry luminaries, lobbyists, and corporate representatives that have had, and continue to have, a hand in one, ensuring that a deep bored tunnel was picked to replace the Viaduct, two, in ensuring that the state and city political powers went along for the ride, three, in ensuring that individuals from their ranks have both paid consultant positions with WSDOT and continue to hold important positions on the advisory boards that are overseeing the project; all poised to intercede and divert any inquiry or fault finding away from the tunneling industry.

There is no distinction from the industry-backed bureaucratic handling of the Big Dig, of the Deepwater Horizon project, and the Alaskan Way deep bored tunnel project.

Just over a year and a half ago WSDOT started the same myriad of environmental review shortcuts and lax agency oversight initiatives for the bored tunnel, the same kind of initiatives that led to the Deepwater Horizon disaster. WSDOT's sentiments and tactics for the environmental review of the tunnel project mimic those of the Deepwater debacle – short cuts, ignore alternative options, and zero transparency.

First the "experts", read tunnel industry representatives, recommended that WSDOT push the limits of the environmental review process to the max, implementing as much of the project as is possible prior to the EIS being completed. Then they pushed WSDOT to "identify ways to enhance the schedule" in order to "effectively fast track either the environmental process or design/construction efforts before the ROD". According to these industry advisors, the success of getting the deep bored project started as soon as possible was dependent upon "the degree to which the community and the local stakeholders—all of whom have a legal and political light to engage in the environmental analysis process—support fast-tracked activities." They went on to say, "Thus, it is important to engage in effective public involvement and collaboration with stakeholders to make sure these people are ready, willing and able to collaborate with any schedule enhancement." – translation: tightly manage the public so they don't oppose anything related to the tunnel.

The shortcuts and insider tricks don't stop there though. WSDOT has been intent on cutting project costs at every turn, "value engineering" out every tunnel feature they can in an effort to get the project costs within the artificial cost limits that they set in order to sell the project. However, in the process, just as with the Deepwater project, WSDOT and its tunnel industry consultants have had to compromise the safety of the tunnel and the adjacent roadways they're going to build, seeking federal design deviations from the Federal Highway Administration, which they have received, seeking greatly reduced fire safety standards from the Seattle Fire Department, which they also have received, and seeking waivers of environmental and local permits, which they have received.

The contractors for the tunnel, just as BP, are also banking on their industry ties inside WSDOT, counting on the consultants to WSDOT to hold them in good stead – and on the WSDOT officials to run interference for them, get them the change orders and keep them tied into the WSDOT money machine; however, that's the problem, reading the background for the Deep Water disaster, there is the same setup here in Washington - WSDOT in tandem with tunnel industry lobbyists and consultants, that were on retainer or who have now gotten contracts from WSDOT, jointly working together to get the tunnel project started, and then working to get multi-million contracts after the tunnel project becomes a fait accompli. See http://www.scatnow.com/TunnelCollapses

THE DEEP BORED TUNNEL IS A MONEY PIT THAT SHACKLES OUR FUTURE

On the following pages are a review of the costs and future expenditures related to building the bored tunnel, over \$5 Billion and counting. Don't be fooled by the claim that all this isn't related to the AWV project – you have to keep track of all the meetings and places where WSDOT tells its stories. Depending on the audience it tells one story, another audience it tells another, but after over two years of disparate stories, facts, and figures, SCAT has synthesized all the tunnel project stories here – this is the AWV project – \$5.1 Billion and counting.

MAYOR TO CUT WADING-POOL HOURS, DELAYS HIRING 21 POLICE OFFICERS IN MIDYEAR BUDGET CUTS - SEATTLE TIMES

For Seattle considerations alone - even if its planned

expenditure of \$1 Billion and counting can be offset with grants of some kind – Fed money, with local improvement districts, parking taxes, new levies, etc., the City will still be faced within a few years of the tunnel/waterfront being built with close to \$50 million in annual debt service and expenditures related to this project. That's because even if the City does come up with revenue sources like taxes, LID's, and levies for its tunnel related projects, that money will never be realized at one time, instead bonds will be issued against it, and by extensions the bonds will bear interest that must be paid – i.e. new debt service that the City must pay. This in addition to the fact that there will be future expenditures and expenses for running and maintaining the City that will emerge or that will continue that have to be funded.

We're cutting back on wading pools for kids for heaven's sake; the City can't hire a mere 21 police officers; for the foreseeable future the City's deficit is pegged at between \$60 and 50 Million. But we can add another \$50 Million a year to that in order to then run \$100 Million per year in the hole for a tunnel? A half functioning hole in the ground that makes the tunneling cartel richer, makes the consultants to and buddies of WSDOT richer, the campaign chests of the electeds richer, and the rest of us poorer? That's a fair deal – NOT!

The problem with this tunnel project is that the Governor and WSDOT with the complicity of our City officials and the legislature have sucked every member of the taxpaying public into their morass.

Look at the numbers on the next pages – the state will be paying approximately double what Seattle will have to pay out in debt service/operations for this project, however they are 10+ times larger economically than the City.



Governor Gregoire and her band of merry tunnel supporters (June 16th)

On June 16th the Governor told a standing room only crowd of tunnel supporters that the Legislature never gives WSDOT a blank check for a project, but the Legislature never has left WSDOT hanging if the project goes over budget.

Isn't that a telling remark?

Doesn't it also seem a little odd that the City is on the hook for $1/4^{\text{th}}$ of this project, *that is a State project*, when it is a $1/10^{\text{th}}$ or

less the size of the state? Are we that desperate for a tunnel?

WSDOT has gone on the offensive about this before – that it is illegitimate to include the interest in coming up with a total project cost – WSDOT's multi-million dollar PR branch, EnviroIssues, tells WSDOT bigwigs that when this is brought up about the interest, to huffily reply that no one buys a house based on the *financed price!* However, big distinction, *people do buy a house on the basis of what their house payment is going to be.* So let's find out what the tunnel "house payment" is, for State, City, County, Port combined: **\$189 Million per year.**

The City of Seattle's tunnel/waterfront portion of the "house payment" is approximately **\$51 Million** annually. SCAT doesn't think the City or the rest of the partners in the tunnel project can afford this. Where is the backup evidence that we can? It has not been produced because by any measure neither the City, nor the State, Port or County can afford the tunnel.

AND EVEN MORE TAXE\$ FOR THE TAXPAYER

On June 21st the City Council was presented with a special report that detailed how much money could be extracted in new taxes from property owners that will have benefited from the tunnel thru a new local improvement district that would raise \$340 Million. Note the irony here, the Mayor and City Council playing the protectors of the common man do not want the State to enforce the Legislature's provision that the people of Seattle who benefit from the tunnel should pay for the overruns for it; however it is okay for the City instead to target those same citizens of Seattle for a like share – a classic case if there ever was one of hypocrisy meets populi-cide by taxation. See LID pages next for further information.

THE DEEP BORED TUNNEL IS THE EQUIVALENT OF THE BIG DIG

Repeatedly the City of Seattle has emphasized to WSDOT that it is committed to more pedestrian and bike friendly streets, to reducing vehicle trips, and specific to the Alaskan Way Viaduct/Tunnel project, that the project needs to reflect Seattle's New Urbanism design philosophies, principles, and aesthetics, that the project needs to "Enhance Seattle's waterfront, downtown and adjacent neighborhoods as a place for people" (AWV Project Guiding Principle #4).



Boston "Big Dig" (Above) vs. Seattle Big Dig in the Making (Below)



Looking at the three pictures on the left, one of the completed Boston arterial (upper), and the others of the artist's rendering of the future south portal area of the tunnel (lower), there really is no difference between the two projects. Scale-wise the future south portal in Seattle will be of the same magnitude as Boston's. It will be just as much of a blight on the urban landscape as Boston's – the tunnel project defaces the urban landscape.

Rather than embracing New Urbanism ideals, rather than being true to the design policies of Seattle, the City is in the process of establishing a brutal concrete gash across this gateway to the city, something that neither of the other alternatives, surface or elevated options would have done.

The AWV tunnel project sets poised to create chaos. It will destroy a totally functional transportation system, and set in its place illogical, ill-planned, and non-working "solutions" to travel in and around Seattle. WSDOT and SDOT have created massive transportation dilemmas with the tunnel project, that in order to solve them has easily added another billion dollars to the cost of the project, not to mention has increased many fold the physical footprint of the highway in the south end of Downtown.

Repeatedly we are told that the City is pursuing green policies and projects, however the tunnel is the absolute antithesis of "green", "sustainability", and "fiscal responsibility".

THE BIG QUESTIONS HAVE BEEN ANSWERED HERE. THERE IS STILL TIME TO STOP THE DEEP BORED TUNNEL PROJECT FROM GOING FORWARD BEFORE IT VISITS AN ENVIRONMENTAL, URBAN, AND ECONOMIC DISASTER UPON SEATTLE AND ITS CITIZENS.

Recent polls show that 60% of the voting, taxpaying

public does not want this tunnel. Please ask your elected representatives - Why are we being saddled with the tunnel project, not just in the worst of economic times, but over our strong opposition to the project?

Contact SCAT now and join us in the opposition to the tunnel. We are actively pursuing ongoing legal and administrative actions against the tunnel project; we are challenging the right for the State and the City to unilaterally ignore the will of the people.

www.scatnow.com

Cost and Amortization Study Jur	1e 2	6, 2010						
New Updates				Cumulative AV	/V P	roject Costs		
AWV Seawall and Replacement Program		State	с	ity of Seattle ³	F	Port of Seattle	k	(ing County
Bored Tunnel ¹²	\$	1,960,000,000						
Holgate to King Viaduct Replacement ⁶	\$	483,000,000						
Viaduct Demolition ¹⁴	\$	114,000,000			\$	300,000,000		
I-5 Improvements ²	\$	195,000,000						
Construction Mitigation ⁶	\$	30,000,000						
Waterfront Redevelopment Projects								
Waterfront Public Space			\$	228,000,000				
Alaskan Way Seawall Replacement ¹⁰			\$	290,000,000				
Parking Program and Project Services ⁷			\$	28,000,000				
AWV Related Projects ^{3, 11}								
Mercer East			\$	161,000,000				
Mercer West ¹⁵			\$	125,000,000				
S. Spokane St. Viaduct ¹³	\$	20,000,000	\$	35,000,000	\$	1,500,000		
519 Ramp ¹²	\$	85,000,000						
Thomas Street (estimate)			\$	5,500,000				
AWV Utility Relocations ^{3, 6}	\$	45,000,000	\$	250,000,000				
Seattle Public Utility Relocations								
Seattle City Light Utility Relocations								
1st Ave Streetcar/Waterfront ^{6, 15}	Se	ee Note #15 ->	\$	140,000,000				
Intelligent Traffic Systems								
King County Metro Subsidies								
Initial Outlay ^{6, 8}	\$	30,000,000	\$	155,000,000			\$	190,000,000
WSDOT/SDOT Prior Expenditures	\$	300,000,000	, \$	25,000,000			-	
	\$	3,262,000,000	\$	1,442,500,000	\$	301,500,000	\$	190,000,000
Previous			\$	1,417,500,000				- ·
Amount of Change			\$	25,000,000				
Total Cost of AWV Tunnel Project	\$	5,196,000,000	\$	2,889,430,004	\$	8,085,430,004		
		Principal		Interest		Combined		

Annual AWV Tunnel Related CostsEventsAnnual Interest Only Payments\$ 5,000,000Annual Policies and Management 2\$ 5,381,000Annual Op & Main Cost of Tunnel 4\$ 5,381,000	00							
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Annual Policies and Management 2\$ 5,000,CAnnual Op & Main Cost of Tunnel 4\$ 5,381,C	00				Ŷ	88,008,972	88,008,972 \$ 42,113,338 \$ 8,802,199	\$ 8,802,199
Ŷ								
	2							
Annual Traffic/Trolley Management ²	Ŷ	10,000,000						
King County Metro Subsidies/Operations								
Annual ^{2, 8}				Ş	15,000,000			
Total Annual Costs \$ 10,381,000 \$		10,000,000 \$	- \$	Ş	15,000,000 \$		88,008,972 \$ 42,113,338 \$ 8,802,199	\$ 8,802,199
State	City c	of Seattle	Port of Seattle	Kin	King County	State	City of Seattle	Port of Seattle

Со	st and Amo	rtization Study	June 26, 20		
		Post Tunnel P	•		
		Intere	est ¹		
	State	City of Seattle	Port of Seattle	k	(ing County
\$	1,144,431,797				
\$	282,020,693				
\$	66,563,891		\$ 175,168,132		
\$	17,516,814				
\$	17,516,814				
		\$ 133,127,780			
		\$ 169,329,195			
		\$ 16,349,025			
		\$ 94,006,898			
		\$ 72,986,722			
\$	11,677,875	\$ 20,436,282	\$ 875,840		
\$	49,630,970				
		\$ 3,211,415			
\$	26,275,220	\$ 145,973,443			
		Ć 01 745 120			
		\$ 81,745,129			
\$	17,516,814	\$ 90,503,534		\$	110,939,81
\$	127,028,559	\$ 14,597,345			
\$	1,760,179,446	\$ 842,266,768	\$ 176,043,972	\$	110,939,81

Cost and Amortization Study Ju	ne 2	26, 2010	
Augnitude of Financial Impact			
Proj. Annual Debt Service & Operating Cost R	elate	d to AWV Tunnel	Prior
State of Washington	\$	98,389,972	\$ 98,389,972
City of Seattle	\$	52,113,338	\$ 51,383,471
King County	\$	20,546,991	\$ 20,546,991
Port of Seattle	\$	8,802,199	\$ 8,802,199
Annual Operating Budget			
State of Washington	\$	35,000,000,000	
City of Seattle	\$	3,600,000,000	
King County	\$	5,000,100,000	
Port of Seattle	\$	500,000,000	
% of Annual Operating Budget for AWV Tunne	el		
State of Washington		0.28%	0.28%
City of Seattle		1.45%	1.43%
King County		0.41%	0.41%
Port of Seattle ⁵		17.60%	17.60%
Annual \$ Expended on Transportation	_		
State of Washington	\$	3,700,000,000	
City of Seattle	\$	310,000,000	
King County	\$	27,021,000	
Port of Seattle			
% of Annual Expended on Transportation			
State of Washington		10.57%	
City of Seattle		8.61%	
King County		0.54%	
Port of Seattle		0.00%	

	V Project Costs Financial Assumptions:								
1	All interest is based on 20 year term, 5% ra calculated on 15 year amortization b/c WS have already been paid, but some is being	DOT is refinancing pri	or years' bonds, so	-	•				
2	WSDOT Handout "Stakeholder Advisory Co responsible.	ommittee, Nov. 20, 20	08 Guiding Principl	e #5: Create solution	is that are fiscally				
3	"CITY OF SEATTLE 2010-2015 ADOPTED CAP •For SDOT, \$443 million is allocated from 2 design of the seawall and seawall test sec Phase, and \$6.7 million for other planning • For Seattle Public Utilities, \$15.0 million replacement, and protection of the water wastewater, not including coordinated pro • For Seattle City Light, \$132.1 million is all management costs related to the relocation betterment/opportunity projects, not including • For Seattle City Light, \$132.1 million is allocated to the relocation • For Seattle City Light, \$132.1 million is allocated to the relocation • For Seattle City Light, \$132.1 million is allocated to the relocation • For Seattle City Light, \$132.1 million is allocated to the relocation • For Seattle City Light, \$132.1 million is allocated to the relocation • For Seattle City Light, \$132.1 million is allocated to the relocation • For Seattle City Light, \$132.1 million is allocated to the relocation • For Seattle City Light, \$132.1 million is allocated to the relocation • For Seattle City Light, \$132.1 million is allocated to the relocation • For Seattle City Light, \$132.1 million is allocated to the relocation • For Seattle City Light, \$132.1 million is allocated to the relocation better ment/opport to	2010 to 2015. Work in tion, \$9.3 million for o , design, and construct is allocated from 2010 infrastructure and \$1 ojects outside of the l located from 2010 thr on of infrastructure al	2010 includes \$7.5 r design on Mercer C ction support. O through 2015 to su 4.9 million is alloca base program scope ough 2015 for desig ong the four-mile c	orridor Project West upport the relocation ted for drainage and a. on review and project corridor and associate	n, t ed				
4	4 "Bored Tunnel Alternative Facility Operations and Maintenance Cost Estimate" Submitted to WSDOT by Parsons Brinckerhoff, August 2009								
5	5 Exceeds Port of Seattle's Bonding/Debt Capacity?								
	6 "Understanding the program's cost and funding", WSDOT handout, January to April 2010								
7	7 City of Seattle "Overview and Initial Issues Identification ALASKAN WAY VIADUCT & SEAWALL REPLACEMENT" Prepared by Staff: Dan Eder and Norm Schwab, Date Prepared: October 16, 2009								
8	8 "Alaskan Way Viaduct and Seawall Replacement Program", WSDOT Presentation at WASHTO 2009 Annual Meeting Seattle, WA, July 11-14, 2009								
9	9 "Funding the AWV & Seawall Replacement Project in the Context of the City's Other Capital Needs", Special Committee on AWV & Seawall Replacement Project, March 22, 2010								
10) "Alaskan Way Seawall Replacement Project Financial Plan Summary", Mayor McGinn, January 2010								
11	1 "Mercer Plan has a new price tag: \$290 million", Crosscut.com, September 10, 2009								
12	2 WSDOT Project Pages for Respective Projects http://www.wsdot.wa.gov/projects/sr519/								
13	3 PSRC "Spokane Street Widening Project", 2009. Note: only 50% of project's costs were apportioned to the AWV Project								
14	4 WSDOT quotes the demoliton of Viaduct at \$290,000,000 in order to bring it into conformity with \$300 Million Port of Seattle contribution, however all documents prior to agreement with Port referenced \$400 Million + figure.								
15	15 The City/City Council have "denied" that a 1st Avenue Streetcar is intended, that it is only being "studied", however the June 1st report to the City Council (see #16) squarely demonstrates that a 1st Avenue Streetcar is more than being studied.								
16	Allen Brackett Shedd Report to City Counc http://clerk.ci.seattle.wa.us/~public/mee		/V20100621_3c.pdf						
	All Interest Calculations using: http://www	w.amortizationtable.c	org/						

		nnel A enefit (Milli	Am	ount											
AWV Tunnel Project Area	Low High		LID I Millio				Assessement Goal	# of Affected Properties ³	Average Assessed Benefit ⁴		Term of LID - Years Annual Assessment Per Average Property				
							Base Case:						12		15
Central Waterfront	\$	450	\$	600	66.67%	\$ 225	50%	\$	225,000,000	600	\$	375,000	\$ 31,250	\$	25,000
							Extrapolated	Case	s: 5						
Seawall	\$	12	\$	15	1.67%			\$	6,000,000	500	\$	12,000	\$ 1,000	\$	800
First Ave Streetcar	\$	200	\$	260	28.89%			\$	100,000,000	6600	\$	15,152	\$ 1,263	\$	1,010
Mercer West	\$	13	\$	25	2.78%			\$	6,500,000	3300	\$	1,970	\$ 164	\$	131
	\$	675	\$	900				\$	337,500,000						
									tential Total ned from LID						

<u>Note</u>: All figures and calculations are based on the Report by Allen Bracket Shedd, June 1, 2010 to Seattle City Council. See Report At:

http://clerk.ci.seattle.wa.us/~public/meetingrecords/2010/AWV20100621_3c.pdf

Additional Notes:

¹ Dollar amount of benefit gained by property owners as per ABS Report.

² Based on Low Range and amount defined in ABS Report about what percentage/dollar value City could seek from those property owners gaining benefit from AWV Project

³ Breakdown based on 11,000 gross number of parcels identified in ABS Report, 600 identified as being in the Central Waterfront area, and 6,600 of which are identified as being in the 1st Avenue Streetcar area; Seawall area is an estimate, with balance, being assigned to Mercer West area (11000-600-6600-500(est.)=3300 Mercer West parcels)

⁴ Average LID Assessment - average only - ABS study consists of a range of parcels uses, from undeveloped, to commercial and residential, as well as a range of sizes.

⁵ Extrapolated cases are based on the Central Waterfront Base Case - Base assessment case according to the ABS Report - 50% of low range benefit realized could be taken by the City

Four long term key advisors to WSDOT with deep tunneling industry ties – received WSDOT contracts after tunnel decision made:

Bohlke, Brenda (WSDOT Consultant)



A report from Brenda Bohlke, Chairperson of the UCA of SME and representative of the USA at the General Assembly, indicated that the struggle in Washington DC for the planned elevated section of the DC metro to Dulles Airport to be placed underground in bored tunnel, may well move next to court proceedings⁽⁸⁾. Efforts to initiate that change have not been abandoned. *ITA post congress analysis Jun 2009* http://www.tunneltalk.com/ITA-post-congress-analysis.php

Parker, Harvey (WSDOT Consultant)

To: John White WSDOT Project Administrator, December, 2008: I served as President of the International Tunnelling and Underground Space Association (ITA) for 3 years and I am now serving as Past President. A brief one-page resume is attached for your information. John, I have contacted Gary Langrock to see if I can get another WSDOT/UCO task order initiated for me for some of this work. I have 4 On-call contracts with UCO and 2 with the State and Gary has been involved in all of my task orders. Please let me know if I need to contact anyone else.





Left to right: Mr. Martin Knights, Ms. Vu Phuong Anh, Dr. Harvey Parker, MEng. Nguyen Duc Toan, Prof.Dr. Nguyen Quang Phich

Reilly, John (WSDOT Consultant)



(left to right) John Reilly, bored tunnel expert; King County DOT Director Harold Taniguchi, and Washington State Transportation Secretary Paula Hammond

Principal, John Reilly Associates and past-President of the American Underground Construction Association and Chair of two International Tunneling Association Working Groups, paid consultant to WSDOT: Company Service Focus Areas: Underground Construction

Don Phelps (WSDOT Consultant)

Vice President, Hatch Mott MacDonald, Past Vice President, Tunnelling Association of Canada, Previously Canadian Delegate to International Tunnelling Association

December 29, 2008 Industry advocates for the bored tunnel that supplied tunnel costs, strategies and communications material for selling tunnel to WSDOT:

Richard Prust, Associate Principal, Arup

Vladimir Khazak, Vice President, HNTB

Dick Robbins, Founder, Robbins Company

Kern Jacobson, Independent Transportation Engineering Consultant

Gerhard Sauer, President, Sauer Corporation

Bruce Agnew, Discovery Institute/Cascadia

March 9-11, 2009

Tunnel Industry Panel convened by WSDOT to create ways to "streamline" approval, design, and construction processes for the deep bored tunnel:

Name	Expertise, Input
1. Brenda Bohlke	CHAIR. Geological, Tunnels, Management, current UCA President, SR 520 Tunnel Panel member
2. Jan Keiser	Engineer, Attorney, former Construction Counsel for Sound Transit, SR 520 Panel Member (Contracting)
3. Ed Plotkin	Former Engineer, Contractor, Owner – Consulting on underground construction and contracting, New York, Toronto
4. Jo Bhore	Extensive construction experience across US; presently consultant on San Francisco Central Subway for Construction Strategies and DRB in New York
5. Walter Mergelsberg	Former Director of Construction, Washington Metro System (26 years); currently with Dr- Sauer Corporation
6. Otto Braach	Former Hochief + Weiss and Freitag Chief Tunnel Engineer, TBM Expert, Consultant to Lake Mead Tunnel Project
7. Gianni Arrigoni	Extensive construction, plus international tunneling experience, author regarding contracting and delivery (see Annex, Mechanized Tunneling Book)
8. Richard Sage	Construction Manager for Sound Transit (10 years); extensive construction management experience with pressure face machine, CMAA, TRB Tunnel Committee

Expert Review Panel's Recommended	I Immediate Action Items
Item: II A	Fast track environmental strategy and permitting
Responsible Party:	
Priority.	Extra High

Description of Need:

WSDOT is required to issue a new Notice of Intent (NOI) and plans to do so during spring 2009. This will trigger a new set of environmental documentation, public involvement and review of alternatives, which should culminate in a Record of Decision (ROD) being issued at least by April 2011. This schedule represents an expedited process, which shaves off over 2 years of the standard environmental process. Fortunately, this process can, and must, take advantage of the enormous amount of environmental work already done for the project.

Even so, the environmental processes lead the critical path because the Project's ability to expend final design and construction dollars is constrained until the ROD is issued. This means that the ability to fast track the Project as a whole is constrained by the ability to complete the environmental process.

The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) allows agencies using the design-build process to expend monies for preliminary engineering and qualification of contractors prior to the ROD. Further, it may be possible to engage in final design and construction prior to the ROD if federal funds are not used for these activities. What can and cannot be done prior to the issuance of the ROD needs to be thoroughly investigated and understood. Further, a schedule analysis needs to be conducted to (1) understand what the best and worse case scenarios are; (2) understand the sensitivity of the schedule to various activities and decisions which could occur during the environmental process; and (3) identify ways to enhance the schedule.

That being said, the ability to effectively fast track either the environmental process or design/construction efforts before the ROD will depend on the degree to which the community and the local stakeholders—all of whom have a legal and political right to engage in the environmental analysis process—support fast-tracked activities. Thus, it is important to engage in effective public involvement and collaboration with stakeholders to make sure these people are ready, willing and able to collaborate with any schedule enhancement.

Above Bold: How to make the tunnel a "done deal", start "constructing " it prior to the EIS being complete

